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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARCO VILLALOBOS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.981795-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), and theft by receiving, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999) (in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue 1. Should this Court reach defendant's claims that the prosecutor violated 
his constitutional rights by failing to offer him a plea bargain where defendant failed to 
preserve that claim or to support the claim with legal analysis or pertinent authority? 
Because the trial court did not rule on this issue, no standard of review applies. 
Issue 2. Should this Court reach defendant's challenge to the presentence 
investigation report where defendant has failed to include a copy of the presentence 
investigation report in the record on appeal? 
Because the trial court did not rule on this issue, no standard of review applies. 
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's claim, it should review the question of 
whether the trial court properly complied with its legal duty as a matter of law. State v. 
Veteto, 2000 UT 62,1[13, 6 P.2d 1133. 
Issue 3. Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance when he did 
not request a cautionary jury instruction on the unreliable nature of the co-defendant's 
testimony? 
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the 
record is adequate to review an ineffectiveness claim, this Court reviews the claim as a 
matter of law. State v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant must "show that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient in that 'it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' 
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Garrett, 
849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App.) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of 
the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, including: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After participating in a carjacking and home invasion robbery on January 16, 1998, 
defendant was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), and one count of theft by receiving, a second-degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999) (R. 1-2). A jury convicted him as 
charged on July 14, 1998 (R. 232, 339: 96). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 
five years to life in prison on the aggravated robbery conviction, and one-to-fifteen years 
on the theft by receiving conviction (R. 318-19, 344: 15). The court ordered the 
sentences to run concurrently (R. 318, 344: 15). The court also refused to impose a group 
crime enhancement charged against defendant (R. 314, 341: 13). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 326). The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the appeal to this Court by order dated April 1, 1999 (R. 336). After briefing, 
defendant moved to remand the case to the trial court under rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which motion this Court granted, in part, by order dated April 21, 
2000 (R. 343). The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, issued a Memorandum 
Decision dated August 23, 2000, and returned the matter to this Court (R. 353-52). 
I 
Defendant successfully moved to strike the original briefs and supplement the record with 
the Memorandum Decision, and a new briefing schedule was set. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Defendant, known to his friends as "Sniper," was "chilling" and drinking with his 
buddies William Screws and Jeff ("Baby Face") Richman at Richman's house during the 
evening of January 15, 1998 ( R. 2, 338: 82, 151). The three men began to discuss 
"[g]oing to this guy's house and getting some bud [marijuana]" (R. 338: 82-83). They did 
not plan to pay for the "bud" (R. 338: 83, 122-23). 
Defendant was not a stranger to Steve Tiede, the intended victim. Three weeks 
earlier, defendant had participated in an armed home invasion robbery of Steve's place 
(R. 338: 6).2 Then, as now, defendant wanted marijuana (id). 
!The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Loose, 2000 UT 11, f2, 994 P.2d 1237. 
2
 At trial, before jury selection, defense counsel moved to exclude evidence of the 
prior incident (R. 338: 5). Responding to the motion, the prosecutor described the 
circumstances as follows: "The prior incident involved [defendant,] occurred three weeks 
earlier, same victims, same manner, invading the same apartment, with the same object 
and the same purpose.... [Defendant has] been convicted by a jury. That's a felony" (R. 
338: 8). The prosecutor argued that evidence of the prior offense might be relevant to 
prove identity or method of operation (id.). The trial court refused to exclude the 
evidence (R. 338: 7). 
4 
The Carjacking 
Because the three friends needed a car to get to Steve's place, they set out on foot 
to "jack" one (R. 338: 83-84, 101, 123-24, 126). They brought with them a screwdriver 
and other tools to "[break] the ignition" (R. 338: 84, 124). 
Because Saturns are "easy to steal," the men selected a purple Saturn parked in a 
driveway several blocks away (R. 338: 85,125, 149, 233). Screws kept lookout while 
defendant and Richman got into the car and "started messing" (R. 338: 85).3 After about 
10-15 minutes, the porch light went on, and the three fled (R. 338: 85, 101, 126). 
Minutes later, they returned to tinker with the ignition some more - this time successfully 
(R. 338: 85-86). 
Defendant started the car, and the men drove back to Richman's house to pick up a 
15 inch metal pipe, 2 to 3 inches in diameter, which they intended to use to steal the 
marijuana (R. 338: 68, 86, 164). Approximately two hours had elapsed since they left 
Richman's house to steal the car (R. 338: 84). 
The three friends next went to another friend's home, where they met Mo 
Fonohema and Richard "Psycho" Houston (R. 338: 86). They asked Fonohema and 
3Richman's testimony differed. He stated that defendant kept lookout while he and 
Screws worked to break the car's ignition (R. 338: 125, 148-49). Under Utah's 
accomplice liability statute, however, defendant was equally culpable under either 
scenario. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999). 
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Houston "if they wanted to go pick up two pounds [of marijuana] with us" (R. 338: 129). 
Fonohema and Houston "said yeah" (id.). 
In the early morning hours of January 16, the five men got in the Saturn and drove 
to the Orem home Larry and Barbara Barton shared with their three children (R. 338: 62-
63, 65, 129). 
"They 're Here Again " 
Barbara's son Steve Tiede, 20, and his friends Mark, Ashley, and Tony were 
playing Nintendo 64 in Steve's room over the garage when they heard a car pull up (R. 
338: 62-65). Mark looked out the window and saw the Saturn backing up the driveway. 
Defendant and his friends got out of the car, walked around the back of the garage, 
entered the sliding glass door, and ran up the stairs (R. 338: 63, 88). At the top of the 
stairs, defendant, Screws and Richman put on ski masks Screws had stolen from WalMart 
for the occasion, "just in case anything went wrong" (R. 338: 88, 162, 164). Screws 
draped a stocking cap over his hand to make it appear that he had a gun (R. 338: 90). 
Richman carried the pipe, Screws carried a 2" by 4" with nails sticking out of it, and 
defendant wielded a crowbar (R. 338: 68-70, 134, 195, 202-03).4 
The men knocked once on Steve's door and burst in (R. 338: 90, 156). They 
started "yelling and telling everybody to get on the ground" (R. 338: 90). Screws and 
4Since neither Fonohema and Houston carried weapons, defendant must have had 
the crowbar (R. 338: 186, 339: 31-32). 
6 
Fonohema threatened to shoot the victims if they did not cooperate (R. 338: 198). The 
men demanded marijuana, but, as Richman recalled, Steve "wouldn't give it to us" (R. 
338: 136). Richman waved the metal pipe over Steve's head as though to hit him (R. 338: 
71). The robbers ransacked the room, taking the Nintendo 64 and games, Steve's stereo, 
CDs, the victims' wallets, a pager, keys, and two amps (R. 338: 72-73, 138, 230, 246). 
Larry and Barbara Barton heard a commotion as they lay in bed in their room 
down the hall from Steve's room (R. 338: 211, 228). Barbara got up from the bed and 
said, "They're here again" (R. 338: 212, 222). Barbara charged out of the room, yelling 
"What's going on?" (R. 338: 73). Steve's friend Ashley yelled back, "It's happening 
again" (id.). 
The robbers fled, or tried to (R. 338: 73, 91, 141). Inside Steve's room, Mark 
tackled Screws, and he and Steve restrained him (R. 338: 73-74). As Barbara and Larry 
came out of their room, they saw the two other masked men in the hallway (R. 338: 215). 
Richman threw the metal pipe at Barbara, striking her cheekbone (R. 338: 212, 214-15). 
Larry came up behind Barbara and picked up the pipe (R. 338: 214). The robbers ran 
down the stairs, with Barbara and Larry right behind (R. 338: 214-15, 229). Richman 
headed straight for the car (R. 338: 141, 230). 
Barbara flung herself at defendant and landed on his back (R. 338: 229). Clad in a 
nightgown and barefoot, Barbara struggled with defendant in the snow-covered backyard, 
pounding on his back (id.). In the scuffle, defendant dropped a stolen Nintendo 64 game 
7 
and a boombox (id.). The slippers he was wearing came off his feet (id.). When Barbara 
heard Ashley yell that she had the car's license number, Barbara backed off (R. 338: 230). 
Defendant ran to the car, joining Fonohema and Richman (R. 338: 217, 230). 
Meanwhile, Larry, in his underwear, chased Houston out to the driveway (R. 338: 
178, 182-83, 219). Larry and Houston fell to the ground in a struggle, and Larry was hit 
in the elbow with the pipe (R. 338: 219-20). Someone in the car's front seat yelled out, 
"just shoot him," and Larry backed away (R. 338: 220). Houston jumped in the back seat, 
and the car sped off (R. 338: 142, 178, 250). 
Shortly afterward, police located the Saturn, lights on and engine running, a few 
blocks from the Richman home. (R. 338: 260-61, 272). Defendant and his friends were 
located shortly thereafter and arrested (R. 338: 273-74). 
Defendant was still shoeless at the time of his arrest (R. 338: 284). 
The Outcome 
Screws gave police a videotaped confession (R. 252). He pled guilty to first-
degree felony aggravated robbery and second-degree felony theft by receiving-the same 
charges of which defendant was convicted (R. 338: 79). Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
the prosecutor recommended that he serve no prison time, and the trial court suspended 
his prison term but sentenced him to jail (R. 338: 80, 97). Screws testified for the 
prosecution in defendant's trial (R. 338: 79-117). His plea bargain required only that he 
provide truthful testimony (R. 338: 80, 111-12). 
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Richman also gave police a videotaped confession (R. 252). He pled guilty to 
first-degree aggravated robbery and second-degree felony possession of a stolen vehicle 
(R. 338: 119). Like Screws, he received a suspended prison sentence and a jail term (R. 
338: 119, 160). He testified for the prosecution in defendant's trial pursuant to a plea 
agreement requiring that he give truthful testimony (R. 338: 118-69). 
Fonohema was a juvenile at the time of the offense (R. 338: 170). He admitted in 
juvenile court that he had possessed a stolen vehicle (R. 338: 180, 184). He also testified 
for the prosecution in defendant's trial (R. 338: 170-89). 
Neither Houston nor defendant confessed (R. 252). Houston and defendant were 
tried together on the same charges (R. 338: 60-61). Houston was acquitted of aggravated 
robbery, but convicted of receiving stolen property (R. 339: 98). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I. Defendant claims that by not offering him a plea bargain, the prosecutor 
denied him equal protection and due process. However, since defendant did not 
specifically raise his claim before the trial court, he is precluded from asserting it on 
appeal. Furthermore, the claim is inadequately briefed because defendant has failed to 
support it with legal analysis or relevant authority. For those reasons, this Court should 
decline to address his claim. However, if the Court reaches the merits, it should still 
refuse to disturb defendant's sentence because the prosecutor's decision not to offer 
9 
defendant a plea bargain was a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and did not 
violate defendant's constitutional rights. 
Point II. Although defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to address 
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, this Court should refuse to 
reach defendant's assertions because he failed to include the presentence investigation 
report in the record on appeal. 
Even if the Court reviews defendant's allegations of error, he is not entitled to 
relief. Any remand to the sentencing court should be for the limited purpose of 
addressing the single allegation of an inaccuracy in the report's presentation of 
defendant's employment history inasmuch as the sentencing judge did not address this 
point on the record, and the accuracy of the remaining three alleged inaccuracies is clear 
on the record. 
Point III. Defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice in 
his trial counsel's not requesting a jury instruction cautioning the jury as to the 
unreliability of the testimony of Screws and Richman implicating defendant in the 
charged offenses. The parties fully explored the potential biases and motives of both 
witnesses during trial and argued their respective views of the witnesses' credibility to the 
jury in closing. The jury was fully instructed as to its responsibility to determine the 
credibility and weight of the testimony, and defendant establishes no right to an additional 
instruction further suggesting that the witnesses were biased. Even had it been given, 
10 
such an instruction is not likely to have produced a different outcome where the jury 
already had and rejected all the information argued by defendant on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE 
PROSECUTOR DID NOT OFFER HIM A PLEA BARGAIN IS 
UNPRESERVED AND INADEQUATELY BRIEFED; 
FURTHERMORE, THE CLAIM FAILS ON THE MERITS 
Defendant asserts that he was denied equal protection because the prosecutor did 
not offer him a plea bargain. Br. of Aplt. at 15. He maintains that the prosecutor's failure 
to offer him a plea bargain was a "punishment" not inflicted on codefendants Screws and 
Richman, who were offered plea bargains. LI at 17. He claims that the prosecutor's 
failure impermissibly penalized him for (1) exercising his right to remain silent and (2) 
being affiliated, at least in the prosecutor's mind, with a street gang. Id. Additionally, 
defendant cites as controlling the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 2. 
This Court should decline to reach defendant's claim because he failed to preserve 
it. Additionally, the claim is inadequately briefed because it is not supported by legal 
analysis or pertinent authority. However, even if the Court chooses to reach the merits, 
the law does not support defendant's claim. 
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A. Defendant Failed to Preserve His Claim, 
It is well settled that a claim of error must be presented to the trial court in a 
timely and specific manner in order to preserve an issue for appeal. See State v. 
Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Pugmire. 898 P.2d 271, 272-73 n. 4 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993). As 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims 
of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate 
court will review such claim on appeal." Importantly, the grounds for the 
objection must be distinctly and specifically stated. 
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). It is a "long-established policy [of appellate review] that the trial court should 
have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)); see also 
State v. Rangel. 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). 
In the proceedings below, defendant never claimed, as he appears to argue on 
appeal, that the prosecutor's failure to offer him a plea bargain entitled him to receive 
probation and jail time rather than a prison sentence. Instead, in a post-trial Motion to 
Declare Statute Unconstitutional, he claimed that the sentencing enhancement for group 
criminal activities provided under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1999) should not be 
12 
imposed because it was unconstitutional under numerous provisions of the U.S. and Utah 
constitutions (R. 256-74) (in Add. B). Point VII of defendant's memorandum was titled 
"The Conduct of the Prosecutor in this Case Constitutes a Violation of the Defendant's 
Due Process Rights and Thus the Group Crime Enhancement Statute Should Not be 
Imposed" (R. 256). Add. B. In Point VII, defendant claimed that "in order to remedy that 
wrong [the prosecutor's failure to offer him a plea bargain], this court should, in effect, 
give [defendant] the plea bargain which was offered to the co-defendants. The gang 
enhancement penalty should not be imposed" (R. 254-55). Add. B. 
While two of the paragraphs in defendant's written argument on appeal were 
presented to the trial court, they were offered in a completely different context: that of a 
motion requesting that the trial court find the group crime enhancement unconstitutional 
(R. 256-55, Br. of Aplt. at 15-17). Add. B. Although the trial court declined to declare the 
statute unconstitutional, the court nevertheless gave defendant the precise relief he sought 
by declining to impose the sentencing enhancement (R. 314, 341: 13) (in Add. B).5 
Having received the remedy he requested in the trial court, defendant should not be 
allowed on appeal to recast his challenge to the group crime enhancement statute as a 
In the trial court's words, "It's not unconstitutional for me to impose a Group 
Crime Enhancement, but I believe it is noteworthy that no other participant in this action 
has had to face a Group Crime Enhancement.... [Defendant's] relative youth and the 
fact that no other defendant has been sentenced to an enhanced crime in this matter, I 
think justify a finding that it would be in the interests of justice not to impose the Group 
Crime Enhancement " (R. 341: 13). Add. B. 
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general constitutional attack on the propriety of the prosecutor's choice not to offer him a 
plea bargain. 
In short, defendant failed to preserve the specific claim he raises on appeal. 
Therefore, this Court should decline to address it. 
B. Defendant's Claim is Inadequately Briefed, 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant's argument 
to contain the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah's 
appellate courts have consistently declined to address inadequately briefed issues because 
"a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority 
cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Williamson v. OpsahL 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981)); see also Burns v. 
Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). "Utah courts routinely decline to 
consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 
1998); see also State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address 
argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to 
support his argument"). 
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Nowhere in defendant's brief does he attempt to fit this case into any analytical 
framework relating to either equal protection or due process. For example, defendant does 
not allege that he is a member of any protected class, or that he is being subjected to any 
form of invidious discrimination, or that any impermissible discriminatory intent underlay 
the prosecutor's actions. Absent such analysis, defendant cannot show a violation of his 
right to equal protection. 
A due process analysis is equally lacking. In fact, the argument section of 
defendant's brief does not even mention due process, despite defendant's professed 
reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7. 
In short, defendant has failed to give this Court any guidance as to which (if any) 
test, standard, or analytical formula should apply to his equal protection or due process 
claims. Furthermore, defendant cites no authority that requires a prosecutor to offer a plea 
bargain or holds that failure to offer a plea bargain constitutes a punishment.6 Because 
6Defendant cites only two cases in support of his claims, neither of which is on 
point. First, defendant relies on North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711 (1969), as 
support for his claim that a prosecutor cannot punish a defendant for having exercised his 
constitutional rights. In Pearce, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where a defendant is 
sentenced to a longer term following a successful appeal of an earlier conviction, a 
presumption attaches that the longer subsequent sentence was the result of vindictiveness, 
or a "retaliatory motive on the part of the sentencing judge." IdL at 725. Pearce is 
inapplicable to the case at bar. First, the case was expressly overruled as to the 
presumption of vindictiveness by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 190 S. Ct. 2201 
(1989). Second, the Pearce court's concern was a retaliatory motive "on the part of the 
sentencing judge," rather than, as alleged here, a prosecutor. Third, the punishment at 
issue in Pearce was a judicially-imposed sentence, not a prosecutor's offer of a plea 
bargain. 
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defendant has failed to support his claim with legal analysis or pertinent authority, this 
Court should refuse to consider it. 
C On the Merits, the Prosecutor Properly Exercised His Discretion in 
Declining to Offer Defendant a Plea Bargain. 
"[Tjhere is no constitutional right to plea bargain." Weatherford v. Bursey. 429 
U.S. 545, 561 (1977). In Weatherford, the Court rejected a claim that an undercover 
investigator's duplicity in posing as a co-defendant deprived the defendant of the 
opportunity to plea bargain. Id. The Court held that "the prosecutor need not [engage in 
plea bargaining] if he prefers to go to trial. It is a novel argument that constitutional rights 
are infringed by trying the defendant rather than accepting his plea of guilty." Id. The 
Court also recognized that plea bargaining is not a unilateral process that can only be 
initiated by the prosecution. Id. The Court correctly observed that defense counsel could 
have approached the prosecutor himself. Id 
The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized the breadth of a prosecutor's discretion 
as follows: 
Second, defendant relies on Bordenkircher v. Haves. 434 U.S. 357 (1978), which 
likewise does not constitute pertinent authority. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that no due process rights were violated when a prosecutor, having told a defendant that 
he would be charged as a habitual offender if he did not accept a plea bargain, followed 
through with the promise. Id at 365. Although defendant states that Bordenkircher 
interpreted Pearce as standing for the general proposition that a defendant may not be 
penalized for having exercised a constitutional right, Br. of Aplt. at 16, Bordenkircher 
expressly recognized that Pearce is restricted to its facts. Id at 667-68. In fact, 
Bordenkircher is more helpful to the state than to defendant. See text of Point 1(C), infra. 
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In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the 
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely in his discretion. Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally 
valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity 
in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the 
selection was not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification." 
Bordenkircherv. Haves. 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (quoting Ovler v. Boles. 368 U.S. 
448, 456 (1962)).7 A prosecutor's discretion extends to "whether to enter into plea 
bargains and the terms on which they will be established." Young v. United States. 481 
U.S. 787, 807(1987). 
The broad discretion afforded prosecutors stems largely from the recognition that 
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such 
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence 
value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship 
to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to 
the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial 
supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular 
concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal 
proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the 
prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may 
undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's 
enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts 
properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. 
7In Bordenkircher. the court denied a Kentucky prisoner's petition that alleged a 
due process violation when a state prosecutor carried out a threat made during plea 
negotiations to reindict the petitioner on more serious charges if he did not plead guilty to 
the offense with which he was originally charged. 434 U.S. at 363-65. The court held 
that inasmuch as the petitioner "was plainly subject to prosecution" on the more serious 
charges, no violation occurred. Id. Similarly, in this case, defendant was "plainly subject 
to prosecution" on the charges for which he stood trial. 
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Wavte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985). 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly "singled out" defendant because 
he "refused to give a video confession or otherwise cooperate with the police at the time 
of his arrest."8 Br. of Aplt. at 16. His contentions fail for several reasons. 
First, the Utah Supreme Court has rejected the argument that some defendants are 
denied equal protection because they receive prison sentences while others do not. See 
Herman v. State. 821 P.2d 457, 458 (Utah 1991) (rejecting claims of denial of equal 
protection and due process as a result of receiving minimum mandatory prison sentences 
for convictions of child sex offenses while others convicted of same crimes received 
suspended sentences and probation). The Court ruled that "inasmuch as plaintiffs received 
the sentences required under the law, their rights to equal protection were not violated." 
Id. at 458. 
Second, given the United States Supreme Court's statements in Weatherford that 
constitutional rights are not infringed by trying a defendant rather than plea bargaining, the 
failure to offer a plea bargain cannot be regarded as a basis for vacating defendant's 
sentence or as a form of punishment. In any event, defendant would not necessarily have 
been better off if he had received a plea bargain. Although the prosecutor offered plea 
Defendant also claims that "the prosecutor refused to offer a plea bargain to 
[defendant] because he was a 'known' gang member." Br. of Aplt. at 17. That 
contention fails, inasmuch as defendant acknowledges that codefendants Screws and 
Richman - also gang members - were offered plea bargains. Id 
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bargains to Screws and Richman, he did not reduce the severity of the charges to which the 
codefendants pled guilty. Pursuant to the policy of his office in offering plea bargains to 
suspected gang members, he required that both Screws and Richman plead guilty as 
charged: Screws pled guilty to the same offenses for which defendant was tried, and 
Richman pled guilty to first- and second-degree felonies (R. 1-2, 247-46; 338:79-80, 119). 
And, although the prosecutor recommended suspended sentences and jail terms rather than 
prison incarceration for Screws and Richman, a prosecutor's sentencing recommendation 
does not bind the trial court. See Utah R.Cr.P. 11(g)(2) ("any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court"). Neither defendant had any right to expect that the 
trial court would follow the prosecutor's recommendation. Instead, it came down to the 
individual defendant. As the trial court explained: 
Defendant is not being ill-treated because he stood on his constitutional 
right to remain silent, thus forcing a jury trial, while the two codefendants 
each pled guilty, thus waiving their right to remain silent. Rather, defendant 
faces a sentence with the same maximum potential penalty the two 
codefendants faced. That they received a probationary sentence rather than 
a prison commitment has much to do with their individual and separate 
criminal histories and their recognition of their own wrongful conduct, thus 
evidencing a significant potential for rehabilitation. 
(R. 315). Add.B. 
Third, the prosecutor's decision not to offer a plea bargain was not founded on an 
"unjustifiable standard" under Bordenkircher. Instead, the decision was based on an 
objectively valid reason. In the prosecutor's words, "the co-defendants were willing to 
bargain, [defendant] was not" (R. 280). The prosecutor clearly believed that the evidence 
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of defendant's guilt was strong enough to support a jury verdict, and chose not to initiate 
plea negotiations which, given defendant's refusal to confess or otherwise cooperate, 
would likely prove futile. 
Fourth, public policy weighs heavily against defendant's claim. Under 
defendant's argument, any prosecutor who chooses to try a defendant who has "exercised 
his right to remain silent" without first offering a plea bargain will have denied that 
defendant due process and equal protection. For this Court to rule in defendant's favor 
would, in effect, require prosecutors to offer plea bargains to all defendants who refuse to 
admit wrongdoing or testify against codefendants, and would make failure to do so a 
violation of constitutional magnitude. Such a result would be absurd. 
POINT II 
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE LIMITED 
PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE TRIAL COURT TO RESOLVE 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to comply with Utah Code Annotated § 
77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 1998) (in Add. C), in failing to address certain alleged inaccuracies 
in his presentence investigation report ("PSI"). Br. of Aplt. at 19-20. Defendant argues 
that consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, 973 
P.2d 404, his case should be remanded with instructions that the trial court comply with 
section 77-18-l(6)(a). Br. of Aplt. at 20. However, he failed to include a copy of the 
report in the record on appeal. Therefore, this Court should decline to consider the claim. 
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Moreover, even on the merits, reversal is not warranted, and a remand is not appropriate 
on all four of defendant's claimed inaccuracies. 
A. Review is Not Warranted Because of Defendant's Failure to Include the 
Presentence Investigation Report in the Appellate Record, 
"When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and 
responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate record. Absent that record, 
defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing] 
court has no power to determine. [An appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question 
which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record." State v. 
Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 
289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct. 1443 (1983)). "An 
appellate court's 'review is . . . limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.' 
. . . Therefore, we will not consider evidence which is not part of the record. 'When 
crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to 
support the action of the trial court.'" State v. Pliego. 974 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 
1999)(citations omitted)); see also State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985); see 
also State v. Mitchell 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 
(Utah 1982). Confronted with an inadequate record on appeal, the appellate court must 
presume the regularity of the proceedings below. State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam); see also State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 
1995), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
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In State v. Eloge. 762 P.2d 1 (Utah 1988), the issue on appeal was whether the 
trial court had abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for a 90-day 
diagnostic evaluation. Id at 1. Eloge argued that the court abused its discretion by 
unhesitatingly following the recommendations of the presentence report, but he failed 
to include the presentence report in the record on appeal. Id. at 2. The Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that since Eloge had failed to provide the court with a copy of the 
presentence investigation report, the court was unable to "determine whether the trial 
court's use of that report amounted to an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing State v. 
Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)). 
"[Tjhe presentence investigation report does not become part of the record on 
appeal unless a 'party or a party's counsel notifies the court clerk, in writing, that the 
presentence investigation report is the subject of an appeal.' Utah Code Jud.Admin. 
R4-203(2) (1993). Upon such notice, 'the clerk shall include the sealed presentence 
investigation report as part of the record.' I d " State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 458 
n.l2(UtahApp. 1993). 
A presentence investigation report provides information that assists the trial court 
in determining an appropriate sentence. The information can come from a variety of 
sources, and be presented in a variety of contexts. Some of the content may be based on 
opinion and may be neither quantifiable nor objectively verifiable. For example, the 
presentence investigation report may contain widely disparate accounts of the crime 
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provided by the defendant, witnesses and victims. In addition, the presentence 
investigation report may contain editorial comment on the part of the person drafting the 
report. The report also contains criminal and social history that may influence the trial 
court's sentencing decision. Because information in a presentence investigation report 
can vary widely in its impact and significance depending on where in the presentence 
investigation report the information is placed, the materiality of particular facts or 
assertions can only be evaluated by referring to the presentence investigation report 
itself 
Without the report, this Court lacks sufficient information to review the claim on 
appeal. The Court cannot see for itself the context in which the alleged inaccuracies 
were set forth or whether the inaccuracies, if any, materially affected the sentencing 
recommendation. Therefore, the Court cannot determine whether a remand is warranted 
in this case. 
Completing the record on appeal is the responsibility of the appellant. Since 
defendant failed to provide an adequate record, this Court should decline to address 
defendant's challenges to the presentence investigation report. 
g. State v. Jaeger Does Not Apply on the Facts of This Case, 
Defendant asserts that State v. Jaeger. 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999), controls this 
case. In Jaeger, the presentence investigation report contained information acknowledged 
by the prosecutor to be inaccurate. Id. at 412. The errors were significant, including 
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representations that the victim was "unusually vulnerable," her injuries were "unusually 
extensive," and the offense was characterized by "extreme cruelty [and] depravity." Id. at 
412. The use of those terms indicates that the erroneous information impacted Jaeger's 
sentence. Despite the parties' agreement that the information was inaccurate, the trial 
court refused to amend or modify the presentence report. Id The Utah Supreme Court 
remanded the case, instructing the trial court, in accordance with section 77-18-l(6)(a), to 
"'make a determination of [the] relevance and accuracy [of the report] on the record.'" Id. 
at 413 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1998)). 
Jaeger does not apply here. First, this Court should not attempt to apply Jaeger 
where the presentence investigation report is not even before the Court. In Jaeger, the 
Court was able to review the presentence investigation report and observe that errors 
existed, and that the errors were material to Jaeger's sentence. Here, the report is absent. 
Second, Jaeger is readily distinguishable on its facts. In Jaeger, the trial court refused to 
modify the report despite the prosecutor's acknowledgment that the presentence report 
was inaccurate. 973 P.2d at 412. Here, the State disputes defendant's allegations of error 
(R. 341:8, 10-11) (in Add. C). 
C. If a Remand is Warranted, it Should be for the Limited Purpose of Resolving 
Only One of Defendant's Alleged Inconsistencies. 
Should this Court review the merits of defendant's claim and consider a remand to 
the sentencing court, the State believes that the remand should be for the limited purpose 
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of allowing the trial court to resolve only one of defendant's objections to the PSI. The 
sentence, however, should not be disturbed. 
Section 77-18-l(6)(a) provides in relevant part as follows: 
. . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which 
have not been resolved by the parties and the [Department of Corrections] 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, 
and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the 
alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working 
days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a). Add. C. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Jaeger, compliance with this section "requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's 
objections to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the information 
objected to is accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is relevant 
to the issue of sentencing." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f44. "Whether the trial court properly 
complied with a legal duty is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness." State v. Veteto. 2000 UT 62, f 13, 6 p.3d 1133. 
While the absence of the PSI from the record on appeal prevents this Court from 
verifying the context in which the alleged inaccuracies occurred, the record permits a 
broad determination of whether the challenged portions are inaccurate and whether the 
claims were dealt with on the record pursuant to section 77-18-l(6)(a) and Jaeger. A 
review of the record reveals that three of the claimed inaccuracies are, in fact, not 
inaccurate, making a review for action by the sentencing court an exercise in futility 
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inasmuch as the veracity of the challenged statements is already clear on the record. As 
only one of the four claimed inaccuracies has no resolution on the record, any remand 
should encompass only that one allegation. 
Defendant stole a car. Defendant was represented at sentencing by his current 
counsel. That counsel was not trial counsel. When he raised the first claimed inaccuracy 
in the PSI, the following exchange occurred: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On page 2 it indicates in there that Mr. Villalobos 
stole an automobile prior to this crime.9 It's my understanding the evidence at trial 
was that William Screws and Jeff Richman stole that vehicle. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Actually I don't believe that was the evidence at 
trial. I believe the evidence was that Screws, Richman and Villalobos were 
all together when the car was taken. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I was not trial counsel, so I hope I have not 
misstated the evidence on that. 
[PROSECUTOR]: I would refer the court to the findings of fact as 
far as Gang Enhancement, Finding Number 2. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(R. 341:7-8) (in Add. C).10 
9The parties treated this as a reference to stealing the Saturn which they used to 
accomplish the home invasion robbery of which they were convicted. "[P]rior to this 
crime" simply means chronologically, stealing the Saturn came before the robbery, but 
they were all accomplished in one night. 
10The findings referenced by the prosecutor on this issue are not in the record on 
appeal. They should have been attached to the document entitled "Submission of 
Findings of Fact" but are not (R. 234-33). It is unclear whether the trial court ever 
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From this exchange, it can be seen that the sentencing judge and both parties 
viewed the issue settled by the findings, which were represented to establish that 
defendant was found to have stolen the vehicle. Moreover, defendant was charged with 
and convicted of receiving stolen property based on his involvement in the stealing of the 
car (R.l-2, 214, 232). Further, the trial testimony was uncontroverted that Screws, 
Richman, and defendant stole the Saturn, breaking its ignition and driving it away (R. 
338: 83-86, 123-26, 149-50). In fact, Screws testified that defendant was the one who got 
the car started (R. 338: 86). The sentencing judge presided at trial and was well aware 
that the evidence that defendant stole the car was consistent and undisputed. At that point 
in the proceedings, with defense counsel having expressed on the record his recognition 
that he may have misstated the facts, and with defense counsel's misunderstanding of the 
evidence apparently corrected, the trial court had no need to address the matter further. 
Accordingly, the representation in the PSI that defendant stole a car in connection with 
this crime was accurate and was reflected on the record, and no further "correction" by 
the trial court was necessary. 
Value of stolen goods. Defense counsel then represented that the PSI noted that 
$3,000 in computer equipment was stolen: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The other issue is on page 3. It talks about 
$3,000 in computer equipment. It's my understanding the evidence at trial 
indicated it was maybe a couple hundred dollars, plus a Nintendo. A 
executed those findings (R. 341:11-12). 
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Nintendo probably doesn't cost a few thousand dollars. In fact probably 
more in lines of a hundred dollars or two hundred dollars. So I think the 
total amount of damage would probably be more in the line of $300 not 
$3,000. 
(R. 341: 8).11 Add. C. The sentencing judge thereafter imposed restitution of $314.11 (R. 
341:16-17) (in Add. C). At that point, the prosecutor pointed out: 
[PROSECUTOR]: I looked, and it's not in this presentence 
investigation, but there was a letter from the victim in this case that was 
attached to the presentence report for Mr. McDonald who was a co-
defendant in the other case involving the same defendant, where they 
carefully listed out the values of items taken on both robberies. They are 
detailed there. I don't know why that letter wasn't included in this 
presentence report, but it has been reported and we simply had a different 
PSI writer. I'm concerned because of that. That amount hasn't been 
appropriately placed before the court. 
THE COURT: My order would be that restitution be paid and I'll 
defer on that until you and Mr. Abbott have an opportunity to review that. 
And if not, I'll impose one consistent with that letter, and if not we'll set it 
for restitution hearing. 
So I will order, Mr. Villalobos[,] that you pay restitution to the 
victims, somewhere in an amount not less than $341.11, and it can be more 
when we find out what the exact numbers are. 
I will direct that either party may file a written request for restitution 
hearing. [ would like that matter resolved promptly. I'm going to direct 
that the matter be resolved by either agreement or request for restitution 
hearing within 30 days. 
(R. 341:16-17). Add. C. It is clear that the exact amount of restitution owing in this case 
had yet to be determined and, hence, was not reflected in this record. However, the trial 
llIn fact, the trial testimony indicated stolen wallets, the Nintendo, video games, a 
pager, a stereo, CDs, and "a couple of amps" (R. 338: 72-73, 138, 230, 246). 
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court made the only practical correction available to it, thereby meeting the requirements 
of section 77-18-l(6)(a) and Jaeger. The court rejected the $3,000.00 figure in the PSI as 
inaccurate and imposed restitution in the amount of $341.11, which apparently had some 
basis in the record and was an amount consistent with defendant's claim below that it 
should be about $300.00 (R. 341:8). Add. C. Because there apparently was a letter in 
existence detailing the value of the stolen property, the court reasonably gave the parties 
the option of reviewing that letter and agreeing on an appropriate amount or setting a 
restitution hearing to establish an amount, with a deadline of 30 days in which to act (R. 
341:16-17). Add. C. Both parties agreed to this decision, leaving the court to believe that 
if a restitution hearing were needed or any change in the amount already imposed was 
required, it would be notified by the parties within thirty days (R. 341:17). Add. C. No 
such notification occurred. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the 
sentencing judge could have more fully complied with Jaeger and section 77-18-l(6)(a) 
with regards to the restitution amount. Moreover, any error in the judge's failure to 
thereafter reconvene and finalize its $341.11 order with written findings was invited by 
defendant's failure to object to the $314.11 amount or to request a restitution hearing, 
thereby preventing the sentencing judge from determining whether a different amount 
needed to be imposed. See State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611,617 (Utah App. 1998) (refusing 
to review an alleged error on appeal when the complaining party invited the error below). 
Consequently, no remand is necessary for this claimed inaccuracy. 
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Defendant's work history. Defense counsel also pointed out below that the PSI's 
coverage of defendant's employment history was incomplete: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On page 8 where it talks about 
employment, there was other employment at Intermountain Temporaries 
and at the last hearing we had Mr. Babbitt, who had given Marcos some 
pool related work, although it was several years ago[. I]t's my 
understanding also Mr. Villalobos has also done some other odd jobs in 
here in that time period. 
(R. 341:8-9). Add. C. 
Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court addressed this alleged inaccuracy, but 
turned to another matter before the court pronounced sentence. To the extent Mr. 
Babbitt's employment of defendant was not reflected in the PSI, a remand may be 
appropriate for the limited purpose of determining the relevance and accuracy of 
defendant's work history pursuant to section 77-18-l(6)(a) and Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f44 
(requiring the court to make findings on the record as to whether the information objected 
to is accurate). 
Defendant's possession of a weapon. Finally, defense counsel informed the court 
below that the PSI inclusion of defendant's possession of a weapon in this crime was 
erroneous: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then on the Criminal History 
Assessment, they've checked number "2," which means a weapon, Mr. 
Villalobos was carrying some kind of weapon that's "other." I imagine 
that's got to be a board or something like that. It's my understanding at trial 
the evidence was not that Mr. Villalobos was carrying any type of weapon. 
So that should be a "zero" rather than a "2" which would drop him from a 
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12 to a 10 and put him in the Moderate category, rather than the Fair 
category. If it's in the Moderate, that's five years under the time matrix. 
(R. 341:9). Add. C. The prosecutor responded to this complaint: 
[PROSECUTOR]: In regards to the weapon, there were three 
specific separate weapons introduced at trial, and there was a crowbar type 
of weapon and a pipe and a 2x4 with nails. The testimony was Mr. 
Fonohema did not have a weapon at all. The evidence was, if he was there, 
he didn't step inside, or Mr. Houston. That leaves this defendant and two 
others, and three weapons. Even so, if the court concludes he didn't have a 
weapon and changes his placement score, that reduced him to moderate. 
But because of the nature of the crime he is still in the prison range. So it 
doesn't significantly alter the disposition. 
THE COURT: The only thing it may alter, if the Court made a 
finding he did not use a weapon, it may be sufficient that the Board of 
Pardons would treat it different. 
[PROSECUTOR]: That's correct. 
THE COURT: It would not alter what category on the matrix he 
falls, that's correct. 
[PROSECUTOR]: What the Board of Pardons will do in this case 
depends upon huge measure the Defendant himself [sic], how he behaves if 
he is sentenced to prison. It is a tragedy that this young man is looking at a 
huge part of his life being taken away by spending it in prison. On the other 
hand, it's been as a direct result of the defendant's actions. Everyone who 
came in has told us he made bad choices, bad conduct. It would be wrong 
to let him escape the consequence of those choices. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't mean to misstate the evidence, but 
it was my understanding the evidence didn't show he had a weapon. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(R. 341:10-11). Add. C. While the sentencing court did not thereafter rule on the 
accuracy of the PSI's representation that defendant possessed a weapon during this crime, 
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there was no violation of section 77-18-l(6)(a) inasmuch as the representation was not 
inaccurate. The trial evidence established that defendant was one of five men who 
entered the victim's apartment, three of whom wore ski masks (R. 338: 67-71, 134-36, 
193-96). The two without masks were identified as Mo Fonohema and Richard Houston, 
and neither held a weapon (R. 338: 68-70, 132-34, 186-87, 194-95). Richman testified 
that defendant wore one of the masks (R. 338: 132, 153). Three weapons were found at 
the crime scene, and each was held by a masked man: Richman held a metal bar, Screws 
carried a board studded with nails, and the third masked man held a metal pipe (R. 338: 
68-70, 132-34, 139, 186, 195-96; 188). The only reasonable inference from this 
evidence was that defendant was wearing a mask and that he held one of the three 
weapons. Accordingly, there was no inaccuracy in the PSI's inclusion of defendant's 
possession of a weapon in calculating his score on the Criminal History Assessment, 
requiring no further clarification by the sentencing judge. 
In any event, the trial court ultimately resolved the dispute on the record by 
attributing use of a weapon to defendant. In imposing sentence, the court stated that "the 
evidence at trial is that you, along with other co-defendants, entered the homes of the 
victims with three weapons . . . and demanded money and property, and thereafter made 
an escape" (R. 341: 14). Add. C. In so stating, the trial court necessarily rejected 
defendant's challenge to the presentence investigation report and implicitly found that the 
presentence investigation report accurately represented that defendant used a weapon. 
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In summary, of the four claimed inaccuracies in the PSI, a remand for further 
action by the sentencing judge pursuant to section 77-18-l(6)(a) and Jaeger may be 
necessary for the limited purpose of addressing the accuracy of the PSI's representation 
only as to defendant's employment history. 
As in Jaeger, however, defendant has not argued on appeal that the alleged errors 
affected his sentence, and therefore, reversal of his sentence is not required. 1999 UT 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION 
Defendant claims that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because 
his trial counsel did not expressly request a jury instruction informing the jury that the 
testimony of both Screws and Richman was unreliable because of the questionable 
motives behind their testimony. Br. of Aplt. at 20-21. He erroneously asserts that both 
were required to "implicate defendant" as part of the plea bargains they entered and that 
the absence of the requested instruction was prejudicial because no other evidence put 
him at the scene of the crime. Id. at 2. 21. 
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the 
record is adequate to review an ineffectiveness claim, this Court reviews the claim as a 
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matter of law.12 State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant must "show that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient in that 'it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Garrett, 
849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App.) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); see also Chacon. 
962 P.2d at 50. The appellate court '"indulge[s] in the strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" State v. 
Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2065). Defendant must overcome that presumption, and may do so by proving that 
there was a "'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for counsel's actions." State v. 
Mecham. 2000 UT App. 247, ^ [22, 9 P.3d 777, 782 (quoting Garrett. 849 P.2d at 579) 
(additional quotations omitted). 
12Although, at defendant's request, this Court remanded the case back to the trial 
court for a rule 23B hearing, the specific claim of ineffectiveness raised in defendant's 
brief on appeal was not addressed below. Accordingly, there are no findings of fact or 
legal conclusions to be reviewed on this claim, and the normal appellate standard of 
review following a 23B remand is inapplicable. See State v. Bredehoft. 966 P.2d 285, 
289 (Utah App. 1998) (when reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance following a 
remand for a Rule 23B hearing, this Court "defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact, 
but reviewfs] its legal conclusions for correctness") (quoting State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 
524, 531 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997)), cert, denied. 982 P.2d 88 
(Utah 1999); see also State v. Mecham. 2000 UT App. 247, ^19, 9 P.3d 777. 
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Defendant must also establish "at least the likelihood of prejudice." State v. 
Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^21, 989 P2d 52, This requires a showing that "but for the 
deficient representation, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been 
different." State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 977 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
Because defendant must meet both prongs of the test, the Court "may address whichever 
[prong] will most readily resolve the claim." Garrett, 849 P.2d at 580 (citing Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. 2069); see also Mecham. 2000 UT App. 247, f21; State v. 
Higgins. 920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied. 929 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996.) 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel should have sought an instruction which 
would have stressed to the jury that both Screws and Richman had ulterior motives to 
testify against Villalobos, as evidenced by their plea agreements with the prosecution. Br. 
of Aplt. at 20-21. He argues that their testimony was incredible because they had every 
reason to falsely implicate someone else in order to avoid long prison sentences and to 
obtain a recommendation from the prosecutor for probation. Id at 20-21. 
Defendant relies solely on State v. Maestas. 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999), to support 
his claim that the absence of such an instruction constitutes deficient performance. Br. of 
Aplt. at 21. However, Maestas is readily distinguishable from this case. Maestas 
involved the unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony in a case in which the 
victims of multiple robberies testified that they recognized defendant as the robber. In 
ruling that defense counsel's failure to request a cautionary jury instruction on the 
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unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the Utah Supreme Court relied on its decision in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 
488-92 (Utah 1986), wherein the Court held that upon request of defense counsel, the trial 
court must give a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction where that 
identification is a central issue. Id. at 492. In Maestas. the Court reiterated that the 
requirement was based not only upon empirical studies questioning the reliability of such 
identification, but also on research showing that juries do not understand the fallibility of 
such identification, thereby giving it undue weight. 984 P.2d at 380. The Utah Supreme 
Court recognized that the common knowledge of jurors often runs contrary to 
documented research findings concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Id 
In contrast, this case involves the bias or motive of co-defendants whose testimony 
implicates defendant in the charged crimes. Defendant presents no empirical studies or 
other information establishing the unreliability of such testimony generally, and provides 
no persuasive reason to extend the Maestas holding to the testimony at issue here. Hence, 
Maestas does not support defendant's claim of deficient performance. 
Moreover, defendant's trial counsel did not render deficient performance where he 
put before the juiry all the information defendant argues on appeal. The issue is one of the 
motive and bias of both Screws and Richman. Such information may be explored at trial 
and the witnesses impeached pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence 607 and 608. In this 
case, the prosecutor and both defense counsel presented all the information relevant to the 
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claimed bias of the challenged witnesses at trial, including the details of the plea bargains, 
the sentencing recommendations, and the actual sentences imposed on each witness.13 
The jury was told of the charges originally facing the co-defendants, the charges to which 
they entered pleas, and the requirement in the plea bargains that the witnesses "tell the 
truth." Defendant offers on appeal no evidence which was not put before the jury below. 
Moreover, both defense counsel actively argued to the jury the unreliability of the 
challenged testimony (R. 339: 56-62, 69-77). As defense counsel actively attempted to 
impeach the witnesses pursuant to the rules of evidence, and defendant has established no 
right to a jury instruction dictating the credibility of co-defendant testimony, defendant's 
claim of deficient performance fails. 
Neither does defendant establish the requisite prejudice to prevail on his claim. 
The jury was properly instructed on its responsibility to weigh the evidence and determine 
the credibility of the witnesses and the facts (R. 202). The list of relevant factors to 
consider included the interest of the witness in the result of the trial, and any bias, motive 
or probable motive the witness may have (id). The jury was fully able to properly 
perform its responsibility under this instruction because the prosecutor and both defense 
counsel presented all the information relevant to the claimed bias of the challenged 
witnesses at trial. They also observed the demeanor and appearance of each witness, their 
I 13Defendant and Richard Houston were tried together but were represented by 
different counsel, resulting in cross examination of witnesses by both defense counsel. 
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apparent frankness and candor or want thereof, and their ability to remember. The jury 
was also in a position to compare the testimony of all of the four participants who 
testified as it related to the same events and to determine which, if any, were credible as 
to various aspects of the offense, including defendant's participation. As all the 
information, as well as defendant's argument, was already before the jury, an additional 
iteration in a written jury instruction would not have significantly changed the outcome. 
Accordingly, trial counsel's failure to expressly request an instruction extolling the 
allegedly unreliable nature of co-defendants' testimony did not amount to deficient 
performance and did not prejudice the results of appellant's trial, and defendant's 
argument to the contrary is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions, but remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of 
resolving defendant's objection to the representation of his work history in the 
presentence investigation report in full compliance with section 77-18-l(6)(a). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /X day of June, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IS C. LEONARD7 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(DA person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
History: C. 1963, 76-6-302, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, * 7*4-302; 1975, ch. 51, ft 1; 
1989, eh. 170, ft 7; 1994, ch. 271, ft 1. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
( D A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
Person, thai the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
Property wi&out obtaining the information required in Subsection (2Xd), then 
Le burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
reCeived, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2Xd), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
gjjtory: C. 1963, 76-6-406, enacted by L. Crose-Reference*. — Pawnbrokers and sec-
1*73, eh. 196, 9 764-406; 1979, ch. 71, f 1; ondhand dealers, } 11-6-1 et seq. 
1993, ch. 102, 9 1. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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Marco Villalobos, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DECLARE STATUTE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Case No. 981403414 
Judge: Schofleld 
STATEMENT QF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. An Information in this case was filed by the Utah County Attorney. 
2. The Information charged the defendant with aggravated robbery, a 1st degree 
felony and receiving stolen property, a 2nd degree felony. 
3. The defendant was further notified in the Information of a "Gang Enhancement" 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203.1 with separate potential enhanced penalties attached for 
count. The State entitled the sentencing enhancement a "gang enhancement." For purposes of 
this memorandum, Mr. Villalobos has adopted the term "group crime enhancement" pursuant to 
State v. Labium. 342 U.A.R. 35, 37 fo. 3 (1998). (hereafter Labrum HI). 
4. On July 14, 1998, the defendant was convicted of both charges. 
5. In State of Utah v Norton. Fourth District Court case no: 981403928, Brad Norton 
was convicted of Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony. 
6. The factual basis for the charge and conviction was that Mr. Norton stabbed a man in 
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the abdomen with a knife. The cut was so deep that the victim's bowels protruded through the 
abdomen. 
7 In State v. Kohl, case no. 981403873, the group crime enhancement was imposed upon 
the defendant. 
8. In State v. Veteto, case no. 981403870, the group crime enhancement was imposed 
upon the defendant. 
9 The research performed by the defendant has found only one other case in which the 
group crime enhancement was imposed upon a criminal defendant in Utah County That case was 
State v. Wakefield, case no. 981404210. 
10. The Utah County Attorney's office has policy to grant plea bargains to most criminal 
defendants. The Utah County Attorney's office will not offer a plea bargain to a criminal 
defendant when the defendant is suspected to be involved in a gang. Exhibit A. 
11. In this case, the Utah County Attorney's office did not offer a plea bargain to the 
defendant because the defendant was believed to be in a street gang and because the defendant 
exercised his constitutional right to remain silent. Exhibit A. 
ARGUMENT 
I; THE PRIMACY MQPEL REQUIRES THE COURT TO FIRST hQQK AT 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHEN ADDRESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
A STATUTE. 
Pursuant to the primacy model of constitutional interpretation, the Utah Constitution 
should be the primary source for protecting citizens' rights. A state court must first look to the 
state constitution and develop independent doctrine and precedent. Federal questions are decided 
only when state law is not dispositive. West v. Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah 
1994) (quoting Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts. Utah 
B.J., Nov. 1989. 25, 26). See also Amax Magnesium Corp v State Tax Common. 796 P.2d 1256, 
1261 (Utah 1990) ("[I]f the challenged statute cannot withstand attack under the state 
constitution, there is no reason to reach the federal question"). Therefore, the federal 
constitutional challenges which follow need not be addressed until after the group crime 
enhancement statute is reviewed under the Utah Constitution.1 
H; TgE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES ARTICLE 1, 
SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a 
trial by an impartial jury. Villalobos asserts that a jury, rather than the trial court, should make the 
necessary factual findings in regards to the applicability of the group crime enhancement as 
delineated in §76-3-203.1. 
The group crime enhancement statute states in part that "[t]his section does not create any 
separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense." § 76-3-203. l(5)(a). 
The Utah legislature, however, is elevating form over substance. In reality, § 76-3-203.1 does not 
1
 In Labrum L the Utah Court of Appeals refused to address the application or 
constitutionality of the enhancement as Labrum failed to raise the issue prior to sentencing. Under 
that reasoning, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's imposition of the enhancement. State 
v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994). In LafcoimiL the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the application of the statute to Labrum and found that the failure to comply with the 
statute's requirement for written findings constituted plain error and remanded it to the trial court 
for written findings. State v. Labium 925 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah 1996). In Labrum III supra, the 
Court of Appeals refused to address the constitutionality of the statute for a second time because 
they vacated the enhancement on "straightforward statutory grounds." State v. Labrum. 342 
U.A.R. 35, 37 (Utah App. 1998). The only other case in which Mr. Villalobos found a Utah 
appellate court addressing the statute was State v. Ramirez. 924 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1996). In 
that case the Court of Appeals refused to reach the constitutionality of the statute because the trial 
court again failed to make the necessary written findings of fact required under the statute. M at 
370. 
create a mere sentencing enhancement, but a new offense. The Supreme Court of Oregon has 
recognized that "facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which characterize the 
defendant are for the sentencing judge." State v Wedge. 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982). Utah 
courts should likewise recognize this distinction. Whether the offense was committed "in concert 
with two or more persons" is a fact which constitutes the crime, and is therefore, a determination 
which must be made by a jury. C/* State v Tillman. 750 P 2d 546, 577-80, 585-88, 591 (Utah 
1987) (Justices Stewart, Durham, and Zimmerman, in separate opinions, collectively hold that 
aggravating circumstances in felony cases are elements of the crime which the jury must 
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Wedge involved a sentencing enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of an 
offense The Oregon court found further: 
Although the challenged statute is denominated an enhanced penalty 
statute, in effect it creates a new crime. The jury only considered evidence offered 
on the question of first degree robbery, and convicted him of that offense, but the 
defendant was sentenced on the basis of having been found guilty of the crime of 
"first degree robbery using a firearm." If the legislature had actually described the 
crime as "first degree robbery using a firearm" the use of the firearm would 
certainly be an element and there would be no doubt defendant would have a right 
to a jury determination of guilt The legislature cannot eliminate constitutional 
protections by separating and relabeling elements of a crime. 
Wedge. 652 P 2d at 778 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, this court should find that commission of a crime "in concert with two or more 
persons" is a new offense; and that therefore, § 76-3-203.1, which allows the sentencing judge to 
determine the applicability of this section rather than a jury, is an unconstitutional violation of 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
IH: THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS A SPFriAI LAW 
THAT VIOLATES ARTICLE VL SECTION 26 OF THF UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article VI, section 26 of the Utah Constitution states: "No private or special law shall be 
enacted where a general law can be applicable." This prohibition is similar in nature to both the 
uniform operations of law provision of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth amendment equal 
protection clause of the federal constitution. State v. Bishop 717 P. 2d 261, 265 (Utah 1986). The 
Utah Supreme Court in Bishop further recognized that there are also differences between the 
prohibition against special laws and equal protection principles, although those differences have 
not yet been delineated. Bishop, 717 P.2d at 265. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a general law as one that "applies to and operates 
uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places, or things requiring legislation peculiar 
to themselves in the matters covered by the laws in question... ." Bishop. 717 P.2d at 265 (cite 
omitted). In addition, a general law "implies that the class created is founded upon some natural, 
intrinsic, or constitutional distinction." Utah Farm Bureau v Utah Insurance Guaranty 
Association 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977). A special law, on the other hand, "classifies its 
objects unreasonably, as by selecting from a general class of particular persons, places, or things 
for the purpose of conferring privileges or imposing burdens." Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 
779 P.2d 634, 645 (Utah 1989). 
In Hulbert v State. 607 P.2d 1217 (1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated that under 
Article VI, section 26, special laws are permitted in limited circumstances: 
If a special law is required to achieve a reasonable and legitimate legislative 
end, the enactment is not necessarily barred by Article VI, section 26. It is the 
unreasonable isolation of an individual, or a group of individuals, from the general 
class of persons with whom they are similarly situated, or the application of 
legislative power to subjects that are not legitimately of legislative concern, that 
makes a statute an impermissible special law 
Bishop, 717 P 2d at 265 (citing Hulbert. 607 P 2d at 1223-24; and Utah Farm Bureau. 564 P 2d 
at 754) (emphasis added). Villalobos argues that the group crime enhancement statute is an 
impermissible special law Its enhanced sentences, based solely on the fact that the defendant 
allegedly did not commit the crime by himself, unreasonably isolates the defendant from other 
similarly situated criminal defendants. §76-3-203.1, therefore, should be struck down as an 
impermissible special law in violation of Article VI, section 26 of the Utah Constitution. 
IV: THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE PROVIDES FOR 
"CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE L SECTION 
9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The group crime enhancement statute as set forth in Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1 
and as applied in this case is a "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Utah and federal 
constitutions. 
A. THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE 
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states 
through operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." In Solem v. Helm. 463 
U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that "a criminal sentence 
must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant was convicted." In making such a 
determination, the Court found that factors such as uthe gravity of the offense and the harshness 
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of the penalty," "the sentence imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction," and "the 
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions" should be considered. 
Id. at 3011. 
In this case, Villalobos could be sentenced to a term of nine years to life. Without the 
group crime enhancement, Mr. Villalobos would be sentenced to only five years to life. Thus, the 
mere fact that the crime was committed with other persons will almost double his sentence. The 
enhancement statute not only significantly increases the term to be served but also eliminates any 
discretion by the Board of Pardons for release prior to the expiration of the minimum term. To 
enhance the penalty by adding four years to the sentence and to eliminate the parole boards' 
discretion solely on grounds of association constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" and is in 
total disproportion to the nature of the offense. 
B. THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required; 
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. 
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary vigor." While the language 
of the Utah provision is similar to its federal counterpart, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
the last sentence of section 9 makes it plain that "the Utah provision is broader than its federal 
counterpart." Bishop, 717 P.2d at 267. 
In State v. Nance. 438 P.2d 542 (Utah 1968), the Supreme Court of Utah held that 
defendant's "cruel and unusual punishment" challenge of a sentence of not more than five years in 
state prison imposed for writing a check without sufficient funds had no constitutional basis. The 
court stated that the constitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" is directed 
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"against all punishments which by their length or severity are greatly disproportionate to the 
offense charged." IdL, at 544. The court further indicated that although "[w]hat constitutes an 
adequate penalty is a matter of legislative judgment and discretion," the courts may find that the 
legislature abused its discretion if the "sentence imposed in proportion to the offense committed is 
such as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the 
circumstances." Id. 
In Bishop, the Supreme Court of Utah, adopting the factors set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Solem held that the sentencing of the defendant to a sentence of a minimum mandatory 
five years with a potential for a life sentence for sodomy on a child "Ms not one of those rare cases 
where the harshness of the sentence is [so] disproportionate to the nature of the crime' that it 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment." Bishop, 717 P.2d at 272 (quoting State v. Amicone. 
689 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah 1984); Sfllfim, 103 S.Ct. at 3009). 
However, the group crime enhancement statute which calls for enhanced sentences of nine 
years for first degree ftflony convictions, six years for second degree felony convictions, and three 
years for third degree felony convictions, solely on the basis of association is a facially harsh 
sentence in total disproportion to the nature of the crime. 
V; THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE PUE 
PROCESS CLAUSES OF BOTH THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution mandate that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend XIV, Utah 
Const, art. I § 7. 
A. THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute violates due process protections 
if it is vague or "its prohibitions are not clearly defined " Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U S 
104, 108 (1972) In delineating when a statute is not "clearly defined" the court explained 
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for 
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined Vague laws offend several 
important values First because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful 
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly 
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning Second, if 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them A vague law impermissibly delegates 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut(s) upon sensitive areas 
of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of (those) 
freedoms ' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "steer far wider of the 
unlawful zone" than if the boundaries of forbidden areas were clearly marked 
Id (citations omitted) 
In order to successfully challenge a statute as vague, the defendant must show the statute 
fits within one of three categories: it is overbroad in its application in proscribing constitutionally 
protected acts, it is facially invalid; or it is vague as applied to the specific situation of the 
defendant Village of Hoffman Estates, v Flipside. Hoffinan Estates Inc.. 455 U S 489, 494-95 
(1982), Utah v. Murphy, 674 P 2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983), Utah v, Phams, 846 P 2d 454, 466 
(Utah Ct App 1993), cert denied 857 P 2d 948 (Utah 1993) As applied to the defendant, Utah 
Code Annotated §76-3-203 1 is void for vagueness in two categories it is overbroad and is vague 
in its application to the facts of the defendant's case 
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have long recognized the 
right of free association as it contributes to other freedoms. The First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging.., the right of the people 
to peaceably assemble." U S. Const, amend. I. The United States Supreme Court explained the 
importance of the right to free association compared to other guaranteed rights. They stated: 
u[f]rom the outset, the right of assembly was regarded not only as an independent right but also as 
a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was 
deliberately linked by the draftsmen." Richmond Newspapers. Inc. v. Virginia. 448 U.S. 555, 577-
78(1980). 
The defendant does not claim he has the right to commit crimes but simply that he can not 
be punished for associating with others. The group crime enhancement statute punishes an 
individual not for committing a crime (this is covered in the unenhanced sentence) but simply for 
committing the crime in conjunction with other people. See §73-3-203.2(1 )(a)-(b). In fact, the 
statute is not barred even if "the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense." §73-3-203.2(5)(b). 
The statute attempts to diffuse this issue by stating that the statute "does not create any 
separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense." §73-3-203.2(5)(a). 
This is simply a case of form over substance. In the end, sentences in this case will be enhanced 
simply because Mr. Villalobos was with others when a crime was committed. 
B. UTAH'S GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS VAGUE AS IT 
CALLS FOR ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT 
The Group Crime Enhancement directs that the sentencing judge shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty on the defendant. The sections read: 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
§ 76-3-203. l(5)(c)-(6)(b). 
The discretion granted to the sentencing judge by this section is vague as applied to 
standards outlined by the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court. The Court 
has stated that judges should not be allowed to decide matters on "an ad hoc and subjective basis, 
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Gravned. 408 U.S. at 109 
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed that a vague statute is any prohibition that can be 
arbitrarily enforced against a defendant or a provision that would leave its enforcement against a 
defendant to the discretion of enforcing officers. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 
816,820(1991). 
Under the Utah statute, the sentencing judge is not guided by specific criteria to determine 
if any given defendant should be subject to the sentence enhancement. The judge is left to decide 
whether to apply the statute to every person convicted of a crime in association with two other 
people or only to those associated with street criminal gangs as the legislative history directs. 
Further, the judge is not guided in how to determine if "the interests of justice would be best 
served" by foregoing the enhancement penalty. §76-3-203.1 (6)(a). In the end, the sentencing 
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judge is arbitrarily left to decide for himself whether the defendant should be subject to the 
sentence enhancement. 
The arbitrary nature of the enforcement is illustrated by the rarity of the actual imposition 
of the enforcement. While numerous persons are charged with a group crime enhancement, many 
of those charges are plea bargained away, as was done with the co-defendants in this case. 
Further, judges oftentimes impose the group crime enhancement but then suspend its imposition. 
Only three times, in Utah County, has a criminal defendant borne the brunt of the group crime 
penalty enhancement. 
C. THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ENCROACHMENT ON FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY 
INTERESTS IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF BOTH THE 
UTAH AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution mandate that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend XIV; Utah 
Const, art. I §7. These substantive due process provisions are aimed at the protection of 
individuals against the arbitrary actions of government. See United States v. Certain Real 
Property. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992). (Affirmed Dec. 6, 1995, 70 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. App. 1995). 
They were created to guarantee the protection and preservation of rights "implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty" and "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 
1 THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS AN IMPERMISSIBLE EN-
CRQACHMENT QF FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY RIGHTS GUARANTEED 3Y THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
In summary of the scope of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
U S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated: 
The Fourteenth Amendment embodies three different protections: (1) a 
procedural due process protection requiring the state to provide individual's with 
some type of process before depriving them of their life, liberty, or property; (2) a 
substantive due process protection, which protects individual's from arbitrary acts 
that deprive them of life, liberty, or property; and (3) an incorporation of specific 
protections afforded by the Bill of Rights against the states. 
Griffin v. Strong. 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993). The group crime enhancement statute 
found in §76-3-203.1 violates the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment as set 
forth in Griffin because it is an arbitrary act that deprives the defendant of fundamental liberty 
interests as well as denies him specific protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. 
First, the statute arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a fundamental right to liberty. The 
statute as written is applicable any time an enumerated crime is committed "in concert with two or 
more persons." The statute arbitrarily applies upon a finding that two or more persons were 
potentially involved in the commission of the crime (although they need not be charged or even 
identified.) Such an arbitrary imposition of an enhanced sentence, which in this case could be 9 
years in prison for Mr. Villalobos, is a fundamental violation of defendant's right to liberty. 
Second, the statute as written violates the defendants Eighth Amendment right against 
"cruel and unusual punishment." See supra. As such a protection is guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights, it is incorporated as a fundamental right into the Fourteenth Amendment protections 
against state encroachment. 
Third, the statute seeks to punish thee defendant based solely on his association with 
others. While freedom of association is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the United 
States Supreme Court in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449 (1958), stated: "[I]t is beyond 
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of the liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." 
2. THE GrROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IMPERMISSIBLY IMPACTS 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
The due process provision of the Utah Constitution (Article I, section 7) is substantially 
similar to the Fourteenth Amendment. In regards to the similarity, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that while not dispositive of state analysis, "decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States on the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution are 'highly persuasive' as to 
application of that clause in our state constitution." Untermever v State Tax Commission. 129 
P 2d 881, 885 (Utah 1942). Nonetheless, Utah courts have not hesitated to predicate holdings 
reviewing statutory sentencing schemes solely on state constitutional principles. See, State v. 
Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990); State v Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v 
Qsnliy, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987); State v Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). In Condemarin 
v University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that certain 
provisions of the State Governmental Immunity Act which imposed limits on the amount a person 
could claim against uninsured government entities because of death or injury violated the uniform 
operations of laws and due process provisions of the Utah Constitution. In so holding, the court 
applied a stricter standard of review to the statute than the traditional rational basis review. 
Justice Durham, in an opinion concurred in part by Justices Zimmerman and Stewart stated: t%The 
states asks this Court to engage in the kind of speculation about legislative rationale associated 
with the 'any conceivable rational basis test.' However, because of the constitutional status of the 
right to a remedy for damage to one's person under article I, section II, more is required.. The 
greater the intrusion upon constitutionally protected interest, the greater and more explicit the 
state's reasons must be." Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 358. 
The right of the defendant to be free from "arbitrary and capricious" legislative acts which 
impinge on his right to liberty, and to be free from "cruel and unusual punishment," are 
fundamental rights embodied in Article I, section 9 and in the Article I, section 7 due process 
provision of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, infringement upon such a fundamental personal 
right requires that the court engage in a heightened level of scrutiny in reviewing the validity of 
the group crime enhancement statute. 
3. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT 
STATUTE UNDER A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF SCRUTINY 
Because the group crime enhancement statute encroaches arbitrarily upon fundamental 
rights of liberty under both the Utah and the federal constitutions, it must be reviewed under a 
standard of strict scrutiny: Is it necessary to promote a compelling government interest? And it is 
narrowly tailored to that interest? Carev v. Population Services Int'l 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); 
Roe v Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1972); Shapiro v Thompson. 344 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
Protecting the public from the unlawful activity of group crimes is not a compelling 
governmental interest above the standard interest the government has in protecting the public 
from all crime. The group crime enhancement statute as written is not necessary to the promotion 
of such an interest; and it certainly is not narrowly tailored to serve such an interest as it applies 
any time a crime is committed in concert with two or more persons. Other states have effectively 
drafted statutes which are narrowly tailored. However, Utah's statute does not pass constitutional 
scrutiny and it is therefore, an impermissible infringement upon the defendant's fundamental 
constitutional rights. 
Even under a rational basis review, the group crime enhancement statute is an 
unconstitutional violation of defendant's substantive due process rights It is simply not "rationally 
related to some legitimate governmental interest " San Antonio School District v Rodriguez. 411 
US. 1,44(1973) 
In Labrum III, the Court of Appeals rationalized that the group crime enhancement was 
enacted by the legislature due to the heightened danger of committing crimes in groups Labrum 
Ul at note 8. However, if it was danger to individuals that the legislature hoped to address, it 
would have been more rational to enforce stricter punishments on those that commit crimes that 
actually result in harm. For example, in a trial recently held in the Fourth District Court, State v 
Brad Norton. Norton was convicted of aggravated assault, a second degree felony The evidence 
at trial showed that Mr Norton, stabbed a man in the stomach with a knife. The stabbing was so 
serious that when the victim arrived at the hospital, part of his bowels were protruding from his 
abdomen. Mr. Norton has not yet been sentenced. 
When sentenced, the most jail time Mr. Norton will receive will be an indeterminate term 
of years of one to 15 years in prison. If the group crime enhancement is imposed, Mr Norton 
may receive a minimum term of six years. 
In this case, on the other hand, no serious or life threatening injury occurred. In fact, the 
evidence shows that Mr. Villalobos did not actually confront the victims during the course of the 
burglary. While no life threatening or serious injury occurred, Mr. Villalobos faces a minimum of 
nine years in prison if the group crime enhancement is imposed, a full 50% longer than the prison 
sentence faced by Mr. Norton and a full nine times longer than the prison sentence faced by Mr 
Norton should the group crime enhancement not be imposed on Mr. Norton. 
A sentencing scheme which would impose a sentence nine times longer on an individual 
because that individual committed a crime with a "potential" for harm, despite the fact that no real 
injury occurred, compared to an individual who committed a crime which resulted in serious 
personal injury, is not based on reason and cannot be explained on any rational basis. Instead, a 
rational sentencing scheme should first take into account the amount of harm actually done by the 
criminal defendant. Only after stratifying crimes based upon the actual harm done, should the 
sentences be stratified based upon the potential for harm. 
VI; THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE 
UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
Both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution demand that "persons 
similarly situated should be treated similarly... ." Malan v Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). 
Moreover. u[b]asic principles of equal protection of the law are inherent in the very concept of 
justice and are a necessary attribute of a just society." Malan, 693 P.2d at 670. In a concurring 
opinion to Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York. 336 U.S. 106, 113 (1949), Justice Robert 
Jackson stated: "Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require 
that laws be equal in operation." 
A. THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "[n]o state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." Equal Protection analysis under the federal constitution is centered 
around two basic ideas: (1) suspect classification and (2) fundamental rights. The group crime 
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enhancement statute as set forth in Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203 1 places an impermissible 
burden upon defendant's exercise of fundamental rights and denies him equal protection of the 
law Defendant has a constitutionally protected right to freely associate, to not be subjected to 
cruel and unusual punishment, and to not be deprived of liberty without due process of law See 
supra. The group crime enhancement statute facially deprives criminal defendants of equal 
protection with its infringement upon fundamental rights and because it arbitrarily and 
unreasonably isolates them from the larger class of criminal defendants solely because they 
conceivably did not commit a crime alone. 
Because the statute encroaches upon fundamental rights, it must be reviewed under a strict 
scrutiny standard. As set forth above, under an analysis of due process, § 76-3-203.1 fails such 
constitutional scrutiny as well as a lesser rational basis review. 
B. THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE 
UNIFORM OPERATIONS OF LAW PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution contains a uniform operation of laws 
provision. "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." While this provision 
embodies the same principles as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, there are 
important differences between the two laws. In Malan v Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984), 
the Utah Supreme Court defined the general principle of both the state and federal constitutions 
as "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances 
should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Accordingly, two criminal 
defendants in similair situations, charged and convicted of the same offenses, should be treated 
similarly, not given disproportionate sentences solely on the basis of whether they committed the 
crime alone or "in concert with two or more persons." 
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In Maiao, the Utah Supreme Court held that construction and application of Article I, 
Section 24 is "not controlled by the federal courts' construction and application of the Equal 
Protection Clause"; and that though "[c]ase law developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may 
be persuasive in applying Article I, § 24... that law is not binding so long as we do not reach a 
result that violated the Equal Protection Clause." Malan 693 P.2d at 669 (emphasis added). 
Although the courts in Utah have never decided a case wherein a statute passed equal 
protection muster, yet failed under the uniform operation of laws provision, they have repeatedly 
demonstrated a willingness to interpret textually similar state constitutional provisions in a manner 
different from federal interpretations of the United States Constitution. See State v. Larocco. 794 
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988); and State v Hugh. 711 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1985). Divergence from federal interpretation has been viewed as both appropriate and 
necessary when viewing particular provisions. In reviewing this statute, the court should not 
hesitate to uphold Utah's uniform operation provisions and its greater protections. 
In Malan v Lewis, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "Article I, § 24 protects against 
two types of discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, 
the statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based on 
differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the state. If the 
relationship of the classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, the 
discrimination is unreasonable." Malan. 693 P.2d at 670, 671 (citations omitted). The Supreme 
Court in Blue Cross and Blue Shield v State of Utah. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) set out the 
analytical process for determining whether a particular statutory provision complies with the 
constitutional mandate. In scrutinizing a legislative measure under Article I, Section 24, we must 
determine whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action 
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are legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the 
legislative purposes Id. 
However, in Condemarin v University Hospital. 775 P 2d 348 (Utah 1989), the Supreme 
Court of Utah held that certain provisions of the State Governmental Immunity Act which 
imposed limits on the amount a person could claim against uninsured government entities because 
of death or injury violated the uniform operations of laws and due process provisions of the Utah 
Constitution In separate opinions, the court applied a stricter standard of review to the statute 
than the traditional rational basis review Justice Durham, in an opinion concurred in part by 
Justices Zimmerman and Stewart stated: 
"The states asks this Court to engage in the kind of speculation about legislative 
rationale associated with the 'any conceivable rational basis test.' However, 
because of the constitutional status of the right to a remedy for damage to one's 
person under article I, section II, more is required.... The greater the intrusion 
upon constitutionally protected interest, the greater and more explicit the state's 
reasons must be." 
Id at 358 The group crime enhancement statute facially deprives criminal defendants of equal 
protection with its infringement upon state constitutional rights and because it arbitrarily and 
unreasonably isolates them from the larger class of criminal defendants solely because they 
conceivably did not commit a crime alone. 
Even under a lower standard of "reasonableness," the group crime enhancement statute 
violates the uniform operations of law provision. While the state's interest in protecting the public 
from group crimes is legitimate, its application to all criminal defendants who act "in concert with 
two or more persons" is neither a reasonable classification nor is there a reasonable relationship 
between the classification and the legislative objective-particularly when the other persons 
allegedly involved need not be charged or even identified. 
As stated earlier, persons similarly situated are not treated in a similar manner. The co-
defendants in this case have not had the group crime enhancement imposed upon them. Further, 
only three criminal defendants have borne the brunt of the group crime enhancement in Utah 
County. Such disparate treatment creates a fundamental unfairness that must not be tolerated by 
this court. 
VH. THE CONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTES 
A VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND THUS THE 
GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED. 
As discussed earlier, both the Utah and the United States Constitutions protect the due 
process rights of a criminal defendant. In this case, the prosecuting attorney offered plea bargains 
to the co-defendants of this defendant. As a result of those plea bargains, those co-defendants 
will not be subjected to the enhanced penalty of §76-6-203.1. Mr. Villalobos, however, was not 
offered any plea agreement. The prosecuting attorney has stated that the reason that he did not 
offer a plea agreement to this defendant is that he did not make a confession and because he was a 
"known" member of a street gang. In other words, he exercised his right to remain silent and his 
right of association. 
In North Carolina v Pearce. 395 U.S. 711 (1969), a defendant was convicted and 
sentenced to a prison term. After winning his appeal and after being reconvicted, the defendant 
was sentenced to a more lengthy prison term. The Supreme Court held that his second sentence 
violated his due process rights because he was being punished for exercising his right to an appeal. 
In Bordenkircher v Hayes. 434 U.S. 357 (1978), a prosecutor told a criminal defendant that if the 
defendant did not accept a plea bargain, the prosecutor would reindict him on more serious 
charges. The Supreme Court held that such conduct was not a violation of the defendant's due 
process rights. In so ruling, however, the Court was careful to state that prosecutors did not have 
unfettered discretion. The Court stated, "[t]hough to punish a person because he has done what 
the law allows violates due process, there is no such element of punishment in the "give-and-take" 
of plea bargaining as long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer." 
Bordenkircher at 357 (citation omitted). The Court went on to state, "[tjhere is no doubt that the 
breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it 
the potential for both individual and institutional abuse. And broad though that discretion may be, 
there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise." Bordenkircher at 364. The 
Supreme Court explained the differences between the Pearce and the Bordenkircher cases. The 
Court pointed out that in Bordenkircher. the prosecutor was attempting to discourage the 
defendant from exercising his constitutional rights in the future. In PearceT on the other hand, the 
defendant was being penalized for exercising his constitutional rights in the past. Bordenkircher at 
362-63. 
In this case, Mr. Villalobos is being punished for exercising past constitutional rights. In 
his letter, the prosecuting attorney explained that Mr. Villalobos was singled out from the co-
defendants because he refused to give a video confession or otherwise cooperate with the police. 
In other words, because Mr. Villalobos exercised his right to remain silent, he was not offered a 
plea bargain. Similarly, the prosecutor refused to offer a plea bargain to Mr. Villalobos because 
he was a "known" gang member. In other words, since the prosecutor believed that Mr. 
Villalobos had associated with street gang members, Mr. Villalobos was offered a plea bargain. 
As discussed above, the right of association is a constitutional right. By punishing Mr. Villalobos 
for exercising that right, Mr. Villalobos' due process rights have been violated. 
In order to remedy that wrong, this court should, in effect, give Mr. Villalobos the plea 
bargain which was offered to the co-defendants The gang enhancement penalty should not be 
imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth above, Viilalobos requests that this court find Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-3-203.1 unconstitutional. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of September, 1998. 
Nelson Abbott 
0254 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
_M:^ 9J? / r > Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
MARCO VDLLALOBOS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 981403414 
DATED: OCTOBER 23, 1998 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on defendant's motion to declare Utah Code Arm. § 
76-3-203.1 unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied to him in this case. Defendant 
assails the statute on a host of grounds and has filed a lengthy brief The State responded 
with a similar lengthy analysis. I received argument on October 13, 1998, and now issue 
this ruling denying the motion. 
The heart of defendant's complaint about the statute is that he faces the potential 
of a group crime enhancement while the prosecution allowed two codefendants to plead 
guilty to the same offense but the State agreed not to seek the group crime enhancement. 
This part of defendant's analysis is simply wrong. Defendant is not being ill-
treated because he stood on his constitutional right to remain silent, thus forcing a jury 
trial, while the two codefendants each plead guilty, thus waiving their right to remain 
silent. Rather, defendant faces a sentence with the same maximum potential penalty the 
two codefendants faced. That they received a probationary sentence rather than a prison 
1 
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commitment has much to do with their individual and separate criminal histories and their 
recognition of their own wrongful conduct, thus evidencing a significant potential for 
rehabilitiation. Defendant, who has yet to be sentenced, will receive an appropriate 
sentence given the nature of his background and criminal history, his willingness to 
acknowledge his wrongful conduct and other appropriate aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. I have not yet made a decision of the appropriate sentence for defendant, 
but will do so without any notion that he receive some greater penalty because he chose 
not to waive his right to remain silent and confess. In fact, the maximum penalty which 
defendant faces is no greater than the maximum penalty which the codefendants faced 
when they stood in the well of the court to be sentenced. 
In considering the constitutionality of the group enhancement statute, I note that 
neither appellate court in Utah has resolved all of the constitutional arguments raised by 
defendant In State v. Ramirez, 948 P.2d 375 (Utah App. 1997), the court of appeals did 
rule on whether it is unconstitutional for the sentencing judge to make the factual findings 
necessary for application of the group crime enhancement. It resolved those issues 
adverse to defendant here. It doesn't appear, however, that any of the other constitutional 
arguments put forth by defendant have been considered by the appellate courts.1 As noted 
in State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 466 (Utah App. 1993), "[generally, we presume the 
constitutionality of a statute, and defendant, as challenger, has the burden to demonstrate 
1
 Apparently the defendant in State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 1998), attacked the 
constitutionality of the group crime enhancement statute. When the issue was before it, however, the Utah 
Court of Appeals was able to reach a resolution of the appeal on straightforward statutory grounds and did 
not reach the constitutional issue. 
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its unconstitutionality. . . . We, therefore, apply this presumption of deference to 
legislative determinations designating penal sanctions." 846 P.2d at 466 (citations 
omitted). Further, as noted in State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995), in "ruling 
on the constitutionality of a statute, we will resolve doubts in favor of constitutionality." 
In this case defendant claims that the statute is unconstitutional. He has the burden 
of persuading the court that the statute should be struck down. I have considered all of 
the arguments made by counsel and have read the cases cited in the briefs. I simply do not 
find merit to defendant's attacks on the constitutionality of the statute as it is written. 
The bulk of defendant's argument, however, is that as applied to him, the statute is 
unconstitutional as he asserts that he was treated differently than the codefendants. Giving 
appropriate deference to the legislature, and resolving any doubts in favor of upholding 
the statute, I conclude that in applying this statute to the defendant, the prosecution has 
not acted impermissibly or unconstitutionally. Defendant will not receive a greater 
maximum penalty than any either of the codefendants who plead guilty to the same crime 
on which the jury found defendant guilty. Rather, the sentencing decisions for them were 
based on their individual circumstances. That will be the case for defendant as well. 
I deny the motion to declare the statute unconstitutional. The prosecutor is 
directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
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Addendum C 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings — Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3) (a) 
and other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
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sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining
 a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the department regarding the pay-
ment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) 
by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant: 
(a) may be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
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(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997, shall be required to: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8XbXi) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines, 
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any 
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection 
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own 
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised 
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation 
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines, 
restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
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(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) Ifthe court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accor-
dance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mah-
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c,ous injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U S C A Sec 523, 1985 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital, 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant, and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2Xg) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14) 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7), 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender, 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole, 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative, or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76a~406 and 76-5-406 5 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (17) 
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require 
d) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times, and 
(n) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall 
d) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections, 
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(n) order the department to place an electronic monitoring deviCe 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant, and 
(in) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with hoine 
confinement to the department or the program provider 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider 
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you wish to make today. 
THE DEFENDANT: First of all, I want to say 
that Ifm sorry for the pain that the victims have 
suffered. I've been in jail awhile and Ifve been doing 
a lot of thinking about what I want to do in life, and 
if I keep messing up or whatever, that I'll do a lot of 
time in prison. I probably will end up going to prison. 
Like I say -- I'll tell the Court, I plan on going to 
college, and if I go to prison -- I've been doing like a 
lot of stuff in jail, going to a lot of classes, 
programs, life skill classes. I just started the 
Foothill program. I've learned a lot about myself being 
in jail and what I want to do with my life if I have 
another chance. 
I have a job waiting for me outside. I 
wanted to ask if I do get sentenced to prison, if there 
would be any chance I could finish the Foothill program. 
It's a three month to six month program, depending upon 
how fast I get through it. I know I need help with 
problems I have, values I have. That's pretty much it. 
MR. ABBOTT: Judge, I just wanted to point 
out a few things with the presentence investigative 
report. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. ABBOTT: On page 2 it indicates in there 
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that Mr. Villalobos stole an automobile prior to this 
crime. Itfs my understanding the evidence at trial was 
that William Screws and Jeff Richman stole that vehicle, 
MR. TAYLOR: Actually I don't believe that 
was the evidence at trial. I believe the evidence was 
that Screws, Richman and Villalobos were all together 
when the car was taken. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. ABBOTT: I was not trial counsel, so I 
hope I have not misstated the evidence on that. 
MR. TAYLOR: I would refer the court to the 
findings of fact as far as Gang Enhancement, Finding 
Number 2. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. ABBOTT: The other issue is on page 3. 
It talks about $3,000 in computer equipment. It's my 
understanding the evidence at trial indicated it was 
maybe a couple hundred dollars, plus a Nintendo. A 
Nintendo probably doesn't cost a few thousand dollars. 
In fact probably more in lines of a hundred dollars or 
two hundred dollars. So I think the total amount of 
damage would probably be more in the line of $3 00 not 
$3,000. 
On page 8 where it talks about employment, 
there was other employment at Intermountain Temporaries 
Utah District Courts 
and at the last hearing we had Mr. Babbitt, who had 
given Marcos some pool related work, although it was 
several years ago, it's my understanding also 
Mr. Villalobos has also done some other odd jobs in here 
in that time period. 
And then on the Criminal History Assessment, 
they've checked number "2," which means a weapon, 
Mr. Villalobos was carrying some kind of weapon that's 
"other." I imagine that's got to be a board or 
something like that. It's my understanding at trial the 
evidence was not that Mr. Villalobos was carrying any 
type of weapon. So that should be a "zero" rather than 
a "2" which would drop him from a 12 to a 10 and put him 
in the Moderate category, rather than the Fair category. 
If it's in the Moderate, that's five years under the 
time matrix. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. ABBOTT: I just wanted to point out also, 
obviously Mr. Villalobos has made some wrong decisions. 
He's admitted to that and expressed some remorse, but 
we've also had an incredible outpouring of love from 
friends and family and I think that does demonstrate he 
has family support and people to back him when he is 
released. In jail he's indicated that he's enrolled 
himself in the Foothill Treatment Program, and is 
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1 interested in pursuing that. 
2 He's also obtained his GED -- Ifve got the 
3 certificate here -- while hefs been in jail, and he has 
4 made strides and expressed his desire to change his life 
5 and to turn it around and not engage in this type of 
6 behavior in the future. We would simply ask, Judge, or 
7 assert that 9 to life is simply too long. He would be 
8 32 if he were released under that. We would ask for 
9 leniency by this court, and obviously he is in need of 
10 some treatment and some rehabilitation, but we would ask 
11 for some leniency, and ask for a sentence not only more 
12 commensurate with the crime he committed but 
13 commensurate with his expressed desire to change his 
14 life. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Taylor. 
16 MR. TAYLOR: In regards to the weapon, there 
17 were three specific separate weapons introduced at 
18 trial, and there was a crowbar type of weapon and a pipe 
19 and a 2x4 with nails. The testimony was Mr. Fonohema 
2 0 did not have a weapon at all. The evidence was, if he 
21 was there, he didn't step inside, or Mr. Houston. That 
22 leaves this defendant and two others, and three weapons. 
2 3 Even so, if the court concludes he didn't have a weapon, 
24 and changes his placement score, that reduces him to 
25 moderate. But because of the nature of the crime he is 
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still in the prison range. So it doesn't significantly 
alter the disposition. 
THE COURT: The only thing it may alter, if 
the Court made a finding he did not use a weapon, it may 
be sufficient that the Board of Pardons would treat it 
different. 
MR. TAYLOR: That's correct. 
THE COURT: It would not alter what category 
on the matrix he falls, that's correct. 
MR. TAYLOR: What the Board of Pardons will 
do in this case depends upon huge measure the Defendant 
himself, how he behaves if he is sentenced to prison. 
It is a tragedy that this young man is looking at a huge 
part of his life being taken away by spending it in 
prison. On the other hand, it's been as a direct result 
of the defendant's actions. Everyone who came in has 
told us he made bad choices, bad conduct. It would be 
wrong to let him escape the consequence of those 
choices. 
MR. ABBOTT: I don't mean to misstate the 
evidence, but it was my understanding the evidence 
didn't show he had a weapon. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. TAYLOR: There were findings of fact 
submitted on the Gang Enhancement. I have no indication 
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those have been executed. 
THE COURT: They have not been. I'm going to 
take a short recess and then come back and announce 
sentence. 
(Recess held) 
THE COURT: This is the time set for 
sentencing, pursuant to a finding of guilt on a jury 
verdict entered on the 14th of July of this year, in 
which the Defendant, Marco Villalobos, was found guilty 
of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony and the 
crime of Receiving Stolen Property, a Second Degree 
Felony. 
In this matter the question before the court 
is what is an appropriate sentence to be imposed. Ifm 
going to speak first to the Group Crime Enhancement. 
I've carefully reviewed, Mr. Villalobos and Mr. Abbott, 
the issue of Group Crime Enhancement. In this matter I 
do find that the Defendant participated with two or more 
others; in this case Mr. Screws, Mr. Richman, 
Mr. Houston and Mr. Fonohema in entering the residence. 
The evidence was that Mr. Houston only went to the door, 
and for that reason I guess the jury did not convict him 
of the aggravated robbery. But both Mr. Screws and 
Mr. Richman have plead guilty to the charge of 
aggravated robbery, and Mr. Fonohema admitted on the 
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stand at trial he participated. 
For that reason I am going to find this was a 
crime committed by a group within the definition of 
76-3-201. I previously made a finding that that statute 
is not unconstitutional. While making those findings 
however, I believe that in the interests of justice it 
is not appropriate in this case to impose a Group Crime 
Enhancement. I do that for the reason that, first, no 
other defendant in this case has had to face a Group 
Crime Enhancement. It's not unconstitutional for me to 
impose a Group Crime Enhancement, but I believe it is 
noteworthy that no other participate in this action has 
had to face a Group Crime Enhancement. 
MR. TAYLOR: So the Court is aware, 
Mr. Houston has not been sentenced. 
THE COURT: I thought we sentenced him and 
put him on probation, I thought. 
MR. TAYLOR: I don't have his file here. 
THE COURT: Mr. Houston was sentenced, yeah. 
Secondly, my view of Mr. Villalobos is he is 
quite young. My information is he's recently turned 23. 
It seems to me he's a relatively young 23, lacking some 
in maturity. I don't say that critically, but it's 
simply my view, Mr. Villalobos, you've got a lot of your 
youth about you to the point that I think it would be --
Utah District Courts 
his relative youth and the fact that no other defendant 
has been sentenced to an enhanced crime in this matter, 
I think justify a finding that it would be in the 
interests of justice not to impose the Group Crime 
Enhancement and I decline to impose the Group Crime 
Enhancement. 
I have listened carefully, Mr. Villalobos, to 
the testimony offered by many friends and family; many 
of whom spoke about the fact that when they knew you, 
you didnft do things like this. None of them, however, 
were present the night of the offense. And the evidence 
at trial is that you, along with other co-defendants, 
entered the homes of the victims with three weapons, a 
pipe, a crowbar and a 2x4 with a nail in it, and 
demanded money and property, and thereafter made an 
escape. And for that reason, I think that imposition of 
a sentence is appropriate in this matter. I've reviewed 
your criminal history, and unfortunately it's not a 
particularly helpful criminal history, and that also 
justifies an appropriate sentence in this matter. Much 
of that criminal history includes offenses that have 
occurred since you've been an adult. 
It therefore will be the order and judgment 
the Court that the defendant, Marco Villalobos, having 
been found guilty, by a jury, of Aggravated Robbery, a 
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First Degree Felony, be sentenced to serve an 
indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of not less 
than five years, and which maybe for life; and further, 
having been found guilty of Receiving Stolen Property, a 
Second Degree Felony, the defendant be sentenced to 
serve an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of 
not less than one year, nor more than 15 years. Ifm 
going to allow those sentences to run concurrent, one 
with another. Ifm going to recommend that the Board of 
Pardons give you credit for any time you've served in 
custody since you were arrested in this matter, which I 
know is eight or nine months; maybe slightly more than 
that. I'm going to recommend that the board of pardons 
make available to you appropriate drug treatment and an 
opportunity for educational enhancement. You will still 
in many aspects be a relatively young person when you 
get out of prison. And I would urge you use the time in 
prison to improve yourself meaningfully and in 
constructive ways so when you get out of prison you'll 
have something more to offer society, and really 
something more to offer yourself than where you've been 
so far. 
That will be the order and judgment of the 
court. You have the right to appeal the sentence you've 
just had imposed. 
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MR. TAYLOR: The State would request 
restitution. 
THE COURT: I neglected to mention that. 
In this matter I will make a finding you owe 
$314. 
MR. TAYLOR: May I be heard on that briefly? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. TAYLOR: I looked, and it's not in this 
presentence investigation, but there was a letter from 
the victim in this case that was attached to the 
presentence report for Mr. McDonald who was a 
co-defendant in the other case involving the same 
defendant, where they carefully listed out the values of 
items take on both robberies. They are detailed there. 
I don't know why that letter wasn't included in this 
presentence report, but it has been reported and we 
simply had a different PSI writer. I'm concerned 
because of that. That amount hasn't been appropriately 
placed before the court. 
THE COURT: My order would be that 
restitution be paid and I'll defer on that until you and 
Mr. Abbott have an opportunity to review that. And if 
not, I'll impose one consistent with that letter, and if 
not we'll set it for restitution hearing. 
So I will order, Mr. Villalobos that you pay 
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restitution to the victims, somewhere in an amount not 
less than $341.11, and it can be more when we find out 
what the exact numbers are. 
I will direct that either party may file a 
written request for restitution hearing. I would like 
that matter resolved promptly. Ifm going to direct that 
the matter be resolved by either agreement or request 
for restitution hearing within 30 days. 
MR. TAYLOR: That's fine. We still have, a 
sentencing pending in the other matter before Judge 
Hansen. And I will make that known. 
THE COURT: Restitution will be ordered. The 
defendant's commitment to prison will be ordered. You 
have a right, Mr. Villalobos to appeal the jury verdict, 
in finding you guilty, and you have the right to appeal 
the sentence. Either way, it would need to be in 
writing before 3 0 days. If you go later than 3 0 days 
it's too late. Do you understand that, sir? 
MR. ABBOTT: Yes. 
THE COURT: I decline to enter any fine. It 
seems to me if Mr. Villalobos serves the time as 
prescribed, it would be unduly burdening when he gets 
out of prison. That will be the order in this matter. 
(Proceedings concluded.) 
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